By M S Nazki
Kaun, Kaise, Kab, Kyoon Aur Kahan! Who, Why, When, Why and where! The aftermath of Taga!
From the United Liberation Front of Assam to the United Liberation Front of Assam (Independent) the transformation has been remarkable but if the crux of the whole thing is seen then it’s just another futile effort!
-Some people like wasting themselves, the leaders of ULFA (I) are on the same boulder loaded path that has no destination!
– While India has the capability and perhaps the motive to neutralize ULFA(I), it currently lacks the strategic necessity. ULFA(I) is a pale shadow of its former self. Its core ideology of Assamese sovereignty resonates with few in today’s politically and economically transforming Assam. Unlike in the 1990s or early 2000s, ULFA(I) now survives more through alliances and extortion networks than through mass mobilization.
– The Ulfa-I said that after Nayan Asom was killed, Ganesh Asom and Pradip Asom were killed in a second drone strike during the former’s funeral. It was reported that it was the second attack, during which missiles were launched, that killed the other two top leaders, self-styled brigadier Ganesh Asom and self-styled colonel Pradip Asom. The alleged aerial attacks, as claimed by Ulfa-I and Manipur’s Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), were spread on a stretch along the India-Myanmar border near Longwa in Nagaland and Pangsau Pass in Arunachal Pradesh.
-Speculation over the involvement of the Myanmar army was rife as soon as news about the incident appeared in the media. The suspicion mostly stemmed from an earlier episode in 2019 when the Myanmar army demolished some camps of India-focused separatist groups in Taga and the Second Battalion area in the Naga Self-Administered Zone in an operation codenamed Operation Sunrise, following an understanding with the Indian government. In return, the Indian Army was deployed in the state of Mizoram to check the intrusion of the Arakan Army, which seeks to control Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
-But all this we will discuss later but first back to the basics!
-The history of Assam is the history of a confluence of people from the east, west, south and the north; the confluence of the Austroasiatic, Tibeto-Burman (Sino-Tibetan), Tai and Indo-Aryan cultures. Although invaded over the centuries, it was never a vassal or a colony to an external power until the third Burmese invasion in 1821, and, subsequently, the British ingress into Assam in 1824 during the First Anglo-Burmese War.
– The Ahom kingdom of medieval Assam maintained chronicles, called Buranjis, written in the Ahom and the Assamese languages.
-History of ancient Assam comes from a corpus of Kamarupa inscriptions on rock, copper plates, clay; royal grants, etc. that the Kamarupa kings issued during their reign.
– Evidence about the cultural history and socio-religious beliefs of the people of the region can also be derived from the Kalika Purana and the Yogini Tantra, both believed to be composed in this region around the early medieval and medieval times.
– The religious literature of the Neo-Vaishnavite movement introduced by Sankaradeva are other important primary sources for the region’s history.
-The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is an armed separatist insurgent organisation that operates in the Indian state of Assam. It seeks to establish an independent sovereign nation state of Assam for the indigenous Assamese people through an armed struggle via the Assam conflict.
-The Government of India banned the organisation and designated it as an terrorist organisation in 1990, while the United States Department of State lists it under “other groups of concern”.
-According to ULFA sources, it was founded on 7 April 1979 at Rang Ghar and began operations in 1990. Sunil Nath, former Central Publicity Secretary and spokesman of ULFA, has stated that the organisation established ties with the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland in 1983 and with the Burma-based Kachin Independence Army in 1987.
– A group of young men that included Paresh Baruah, Arabinda Rajkhowa, Anup Chetia, Bhupen Borgohain, Pradip Gogoi, Bhadreshwar Gohain and Budheswar Gogoi were instrumental in its formation. The organisation’s purpose was to engage in an armed struggle to form a separate independent state of Assam.
-Military operations against the ULFA by the Indian Army began in 1990 and continue to this day.
-On 5 December 2009, the chairman and the deputy commander-in-chief of ULFA was taken into Indian custody. In 2011, there was a major crackdown on ULFA in Bangladesh under the previous regime of Awami League, which greatly assisted the government of India in bringing ULFA leaders to talks. In January 2010, ULFA softened its stance and dropped demands for independence as a condition for talks with the Government of India.
-Now it is the rise of ULFA (I). The group has suffered from ideological rigidity, waning popular support, and isolation since it split from the main ULFA body in 2012. Paresh Baruah’s command structure, though fiercely loyal, is said to be increasingly vulnerable to operational and ideological fractures.
-The Drone attack:
-The early morning drone strikes on United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent) [ULFA(I)] camps in Myanmar’s Sagaing region on July 13 have created a swirl of allegations, speculation, and denials. ULFA(I), whose cadres were targeted in what they called “precision drone and missile attacks,” lost several high-ranking operatives, including its “Lt. Gen” Nayan Asom. But amidst the dramatic claims and nationalist overtones, one crucial question remains unanswered: Who really carried out the attack?
-The small camp of the United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent) at Taga, near the Chindwin River in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region, had an unusual visitor sometime in the second week of April. His stay coincided with the celebration of the traditional Assamese Bihu festival in the camp; he also held a series of meetings with senior functionaries of other separatist rebel groups that had camps in that region. The visitor quietly slipped away two weeks later via a meandering route – long before the Indian security agencies received information about the episode. The visitor was none other than Paresh Baruah, the chief of the ULFA(I), which is a banned separatist outfit in India.
-The ULFA(I) became active in Assam in the early 1980s with the objective of gaining independence from India. Baruah is one of the most wanted men in India, who has dodged at least five assassination attempts over the past three decades. He is believed to have traveled to Taga in Myanmar from Yunnan in China after a gap of seven years.
-Almost three months after his visit to Taga came a drone attack. In the early hours of July 13, two ULFA(I) camps and one camp of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur were hit in Myanmar’s “Naga Self-Administered Zone.” The camps were around 10-15 kilometers from the border with India.
– Paresh Baruah is the self-styled commander-in-chief of Ulfa (I), leading the anti-talks faction of the banned separatist outfit.
– Baruah claimed that “kamikaze drones and Heron unmanned aerial vehicles manufactured in Israel and France were used in the operation by the Indian Army and launched from multiple centers along the border intermittently between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. on July 13.”
– In such a scenario, an insider-turned-informant or disenchanted splinter faction may have facilitated or even engineered the targeting of rival cadres. Some analysts are pointing to the sophistication of the targeting—the hits occurred during funerals, when leadership was exposed—as a possible sign of insider intelligence.
-The reflexive accusation against Indian forces is tempting but too convenient—and arguably, too simplistic. While ULFA(I) insists this was an Indian operation utilizing high-end drones, official channels have strongly denied any involvement. The Indian Army, with characteristic restraint, stated there were “no inputs” of any cross-border action. Assam’s Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma added that the state police were not involved either and even cautioned against assumptions of Indian complicity. He further noted that ULFA(I) would be unlikely to retaliate inside Assam, recognizing the dwindling support for violence in its home state.
-Many suspects but the suspense prevails:
-The possibility of the Myanmar military junta’s involvement cannot be ruled out. The Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) has grown increasingly suspicious of any armed groups operating without its sanction inside its sovereign territory—particularly in the lawless Sagaing region. ULFA(I) has maintained multiple mobile bases here for years, allegedly under the informal protection of Naga insurgent groups like NSCN(K).
-But ULFA(I)’s rising profile and its potential links with foreign actors—including suspected facilitation of Chinese drones—may have unnerved the Myanmar establishment. In the post-coup environment, the junta has shown it will act unilaterally when it perceives threats to its control. There is growing speculation in Myanmar-watching circles that the junta may have used drone strikes—possibly acquired or operated with technical assistance from regional partners—to assert authority in areas seen as slipping beyond its grasp.
-Another possibility lies in inter-factional insurgent rivalries. ULFA(I)’s historic relationship with Naga groups like NSCN(K) has been one of both strategic collaboration and latent mistrust. While NSCN(K) provided sanctuary and logistical support to ULFA(I), recent developments—including Indian pressure, resource strains, and territorial control disputes—could have soured the arrangement.
-Some sources close to the intelligence community suggest that elements within Naga factions may have provided coordinates or tacit approval for the strikes, in an effort to eliminate ULFA(I)’s disruptive presence in contested zones or in retaliation for dragging attention and firepower to their own camps. The reaction from Naga affiliates post-strike has been muted, even perfunctory, lending some weight to this theory.
‘The July 13 drone strikes may well have been a punishment for betrayal, a warning to overstaying guests, or a message from old allies turned competitors. What they were almost certainly not, is a unilateral act of Indian military aggression. In Northeast India and its fringes, power rarely wears a uniform. The fog of insurgency often hides more than it reveals—and this strike, though stunning in execution, is likely just another episode in the long and murky saga of insurgent politics, shifting allegiances, and the slow, inevitable erosion of armed rebellion’!
During its peak days in the late 80s and 90s, it had support among many of the Assamese people of the Brahmaputra valley. The majority of the supporters felt that a powerful organization was necessary to get the voice of a peripheral region heard, to the central government. But gradually, the organisation’s emphasis on illegal means and smuggling of weapons in the name of furthering the ‘revolution’ led to violence throughout the state. It witnessed a period marked by growing disillusionment and anger amid supporters. In the conflict, many civilians were killed and several thousand were permanently maimed and displaced. It is estimated that more than 10 thousand local youths were killed and disappeared during that period. In the process, owing to the twin factors of increasing operations by the security forces and dwindling support among its core sympathisers, ULFA’s importance in Assam has declined drastically.
-But who pulled the trigger here:
Importantly, India has been investing heavily in discreet diplomacy with Myanmar, regional counterinsurgency cooperation, and development partnerships in the Northeast. An overt military strike, even across porous borders, risks international friction and could undo years of stabilization efforts.
The government’s calibrated response—denying involvement, offering no provocations, and avoiding escalation—speaks volumes. India likely views ULFA(I) as a nuisance that’s already on borrowed time, not a priority target requiring such high-risk intervention.
The Indian Army denied any knowledge or role in such an operation in Myanmar. ‘There are no inputs with the Indian Army of such an operation,’ Guwahati-based Defence PRO, Lt Col Mahendra Rawat, was quoted as saying.
The Indian Army and the paramilitary Assam Rifles guard the 1,643-kilometre-long India-Myanmar border, which has been affected by civil war since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021.
India had in 2019 carried out joint cross-border operations with Myanmar codenamed Operation Sunrise, targeting insurgent camps of groups like Ulfa(I), Naga militant outfit NSCN, and other Northeast rebel groups. However, no such operation has been officially acknowledged in the current instance.
The leftover faction of ULFA has been using China for shelter following expulsion from both Myanmar and Bangladesh. ULFA’s commander-in-chief, Paresh Baruah, had taken refuge in Yunnan, China. He also receives funding and patronage from the Chinese Ministry of State Security.
Earlier, in 1995, the Indian Army had forayed into Myanmar in an operation codenamed “Operation Golden Bird” whose objective was to check the transshipment of sophisticated weapons by a joint squad of separatist rebels (the ULFA, PLA, and All Tripura Tiger Force) from the Northeast. The weapons were being shipped from Bangladesh to Manipur through Myanmar.
Incidentally, Baruah also visited Taga just a couple of weeks ahead of the 2015 ambush on the Indian Army in Manipur. After his visit to Taga in 2015, a joint squad for the operation was constituted from three rebel groups and the plan executed with deadly precision. It was also during the previous visit that he played a vital role in stitching an alliance of four separatist outfits called the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia, which is now defunct.
Given that history, it was assumed by a section of Indian government officials that Baruah’s trip to Taga meant an agenda to implement that could only mean rejuvenating the armed campaign and more attacks against the security forces.
It is possible that the ULFA(I) chief could be pursuing efforts to form an alliance of all rebel outfits from India’s Northeast, an initiative begun in 2011 when this correspondent interviewed him in Taga. Baruah had revealed then that the plan was to forge a united front of all anti-India groups for a ‘focused campaign and greater results’.
Adding to suspicions in New Delhi, Baruah’s travel to Taga – from Yunnan through the conflict zones in Shan State – could not have happened without the knowledge of both the Myanmar military and China. Most of Shan State is under control of rebel groups that either have an alliance with the military, such as the Shan State Army (North), or bigger groups like the United Wa State Army that have close ties to China.
China has been envisaging a plan of stitching together an alliance of all separatist outfits from India’s Northeast, which was revealed by a former rebel chief during interrogation years ago. Chinese intelligence officers also visited Taga years ago and stayed for over two weeks at the ULFA(I) camp.